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Abstract 
Medical neuroscience researchers conducted a multicenter observational study with structured 
interviews of cardiac arrest patients revived by CPR. The study says the following: the patients 
exhibited no clinically detectable consciousness during cardiac arrest, while previous research 
indicates that brain activity completely ceases with 20-30 seconds of cardiac arrest; 39% of the 
interviewed patients reported detailed memories from their cardiac arrest; 6% of the interviewed 
patients reported detailed memories that also cohere with a near-death experience defined by 
Greyson. The researchers propose that the memories are not illusory, while other neuroscientists 
propose that the types of memories are illusory and the respective experiences occurred before or 
after the temporary cessation of brain activity. I examine the study in the context of liberal 
naturalism and metaphysical realism. 
 
1. Introduction 
Cardiac arrest indicated death until the advent of cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR).1 
Consider the first four traditional stages of death, that is, pallor mortis, algor mortis, rigor mortis, 
and livor mortis. Paramedics use CPR on patients with signs of pallor mortis or algor mortis, and 
                                                          
1 The medical term cardiac arrest means "the cessation of a body's heartbeat and respiration." 
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some of the dead patients revive—the process of death reverses. Alternatively, patients with 
signs of rigor mortis or livor mortis are declared irreversibly dead and CPR is not administered. 
Yet, if the patient has a Do Not Resuscitate order and is otherwise resuscitable, then a patient 
with signs of pallor mortis or algor mortis is immediately declared dead. Similarly, apart from 
extenuating circumstances such as the use of anesthesia during surgery, a patient with signs of 
cardiac arrest and a Do Not Resuscitate order is declared dead (Parnia 2014). 
A prospective medical neuroscience study called AWARE had observed cardiac arrest 
patients revived by CPR in 15 clinical centers (Parnia et al. 2014). AWARE used interviews and 
medical records for the systematic study of cardiac arrest patients who reported conscious 
awareness and other mental experiences during periods of time with no clinically detectable 
consciousness,2 while previous research indicates that brain activity completely ceases with 20-
30 seconds of cardiac arrest. The study says that 39% (55/140) of the patients reported detailed 
memories from their time of unconsciousness; 61% (85/140) reported no memories from their 
time of unconsciousness; 6% (9/140) reported detailed memories from their time of 
unconsciousness that cohere with a near-death experience (NDE) defined by Greyson (1983). 
My paper analyses AWARE and the criticism of NDEs by Mobbs and Watt (2011) and 
Mobbs (2012) in the context of liberal naturalism and metaphysical realism, such as Putnam's 
(2015) naturalism and realism. 
 
                                                          
2 I define that the term mental experience is synonymous with cognitive experience.  
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2. Liberal Naturalism 
Putnam's (2015) liberal naturalism includes truth, reason, and ethical norms which are outside of 
Field's (1972) physicalism. For example, Putnam implies that truth, reason, and ethical norms are 
completely natural while they do not reduce to natural science. 
My liberal naturalism focuses on unobservable entities. Examples of unobservable 
entities are truth values, mental reasoning, and ethical norms. I define two classes of 
unobservable entities: (1) abstract entities and (2) phenomenal entities. For instance, truth values 
are abstract entities. Furthermore, mental reasoning and ethical norms are phenomenal entities. 
This section continues to describe phenomena and liberal naturalism while the next section 
describes truth values. 
I define that a phenomenal unobservable entity is a phenomenon that is incompletely 
detectable by current technology and has measurable effects. For example, research 
psychologists apply the scientific method to subfields such as human cognitive processes 
(Cooper at al. 2012). This includes the study of mental reasoning and memories. Also, social 
scientists apply the scientific method to the research of social phenomena such as ethical norms 
and group behavior (Ragin and Amoroso 2018). Likewise, some aspects of cognitive processes 
and ethical norms can be researched with the scientific method.  
This paper focuses on the neuroscience of death experience, but I will first illustrate an 
unobservable entity and liberal naturalism with an example from physics. Unanimous scientific 
consensus says that gravity is a fundamental interaction of physics, but no unanimous consensus 
defines if the structure of gravity is a force or a forceless interaction. For example, Einstein 
(1961) developed his theory of gravity called general relativity while meticulously documenting 
the orbit of the planet Mercury. His theory states that gravity has no quantum fields and is caused 
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by the forceless interaction between mass and relative spacetime. However, a current majority of 
gravitational physicists hypothesise the existence of unobservable gravitational force fields and 
the respective quantum particle called the graviton (Dyson 2012). For instance, the majority say 
that Einstein's theory of forceless gravity has no nomological possibility of interacting with 
quantum systems such as photons and subatomic particles. They also say that a gravitational 
force field with zero mass coheres with quantum mechanics and Einstein's field equations for 
general relativity. However, no current or future technology could directly observe any 
gravitational force field because of the implied minuscule scale and extra dimensions. In other 
words, assuming the majority that says gravity is a force, then the observable effects of gravity 
are ubiquitous while no current or future technology can possibly detect the structure of gravity. 
Regardless if gravity is a forceless interaction or a force, then gravity is a fundamental 
entity of physics and an unobservable entity. Likewise, unobservable entities are fundamental to 
natural science which indicates the importance of liberal naturalism. 
 
3. Metaphysical Realism 
Putnam (2015) says that his liberal naturalism coheres with metaphysical realism while some 
liberal naturalists are metaphysical antirealists. He summarizes his metaphysical realism: 
 
The form of metaphysical realism that the author endorses rejects every form of 
verificationism, including the author's onetime 'internal realism', and insists that our 
claims about the world are true or false and not just epistemically successful or 
unsuccessful and that the terms they contain typically refer to real entities. (Putnam 2015, 
312) 
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I agree with Putnam's focuses on the principle of bivalence and the reality of most 
referents. For example, my clarified principle of bivalence follows in Proposition 1: 
 
(1) Any precise propositional statement has one truth value that is completely true (⊤) or 
not completely true (⊥). 
 
One could technically strain metaphysical realism into cohering with global skepticism. 
For example, one could say that any precise proposition has one truth value that is completely 
true or not completely true, but also say that fallible human perception cannot learn any accurate 
knowledge generated by personal experience and fallible scientific observation. I appreciate the 
imperfections in the scientific method and the neurological processes of human perception, while 
I nonetheless hold that the scientific method which includes rigorous skepticism has indicated 
many cases of scientific fact. For instance, I agree with the basics of the no miracles argument 
for scientific realism, which was recently defended in detail by Dawid and Hartmann (2018). 
My minimalist position of the no miracles argument for scientific realism introduced here 
says that a scientific theory with global scientific consensus is typically wholly or mostly 
truthful. The argument requires that the scientific theory is based on reproducible observations 
and rigorous skepticism. The reproducible observations and rigorous skepticism indicate truth 
about the natural world. For example, basic scientific theories taught in contemporary science 
textbooks in all of the inhabited continents are typically accurate. The entities defined by the 
basic scientific theories typically refer to real entities. For instance, the basics of chemistry 
taught in current chemistry textbooks accurately refer to real characteristics of real chemical 
elements and compounds. 
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That said, some new scientific hypotheses are eventually rejected by scientific consensus; 
some are indefinitely in limbo; and some are eventually accepted by scientific consensus. 
Regardless of the outcome, every scientific hypothesis can be stated as a proposition while the 
principle of bivalence implies that the hypothesis is completely true or not completely true. 
I also clarify that the no miracles argument is reasonable while metaphysical antirealists, 
global skeptics, and mereological nihilists continue to dissent against all basic scientific theories. 
Nonetheless, I hold that the no miracles argument is more reasonable than any dissenting 
philosophy. 
One final note for this section, I previously mentioned that truth values are abstract 
entities. However, I clarify that the cognition of a truth value or any other abstract concept is a 
phenomenon. 
 
4. The Greyson NDE Scale 
The advent of CPR caused the surprise of dead people coming back to life. A bigger surprise 
from the widespread use of CPR is that a minority of cardiac arrest survivors reported memories 
from their time of temporary death (Greyson 1983; 1985; Mobbs and Watt 2011; Greyson, 
Holden and van Lommel 2012; Mobbs 2012; Parnia 2014; Parnia et al. 2014). Some of these 
experiences are called an NDE. 
I clarify that the referent of an NDE related to cardiac arrest is more accurately called a 
death experience or a near-irreversible-death experience. Also, some NDEs involve a brush with 
death and fortunately no cardiac arrest, while these cases precisely fit the term NDE. 
Furthermore, some NDEs involve an imagined brush with death when there was no real danger 
7 
 
of death. Likewise, an NDE can involve an imagined brush with death, a real brush with death, 
or cardiac arrest. 
The surge of reported NDEs since the advent of CPR prompted Greyson (1983; 1985) to 
introduce the NDE scale. The scale uses a patient survey with 16 questions and three weighted 
alternative answers for each question that have point values of 0, 1, and 2, respectively. A patient 
survey with points totaling greater than or equal to 7 indicate an NDE. See Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
The Greyson (1983; 1985) NDE scale. 
Patient Questions Weighted Alternative Answers 
 
1. Did time seem to speed up or slow down? 
0 = No 
1 = Time seemed to go faster or slower than 
usual 
2 = Everything seemed to be happening at once 
 
 
2. Were your thoughts speeded up? 
0 = No 
1 = Faster than usual 
2 = Incredibly fast 
 
 
3. Did scenes from your past come back to 
you? 
0 = No 
1 = I remembered many past events 
2 = My past flashed before me, out of my 
control 
 
 
4. Did you suddenly seem to understand 
everything? 
0 = No 
1 = Everything about myself or others 
2 = Everything about the universe 
 
 
5. Did you have a feeling of peace or 
pleasantness? 
0 = No 
1 = Relief or calmness 
2 = Incredible peace or pleasantness 
 
 
6. Did you have a feeling of joy? 
0 = No 
1 = Happiness 
2 = Incredible joy 
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7. Did you feel a sense of harmony or unity 
with the universe? 
0 = No 
1 = I felt no longer in conflict with nature 
2 = I felt united or one with the world 
 
 
8. Did you see, or feel surrounded by, a 
brilliant light? 
0 = No 
1 = An unusually bright light 
2 = A light clearly of mystical or other-worldly 
origin 
 
 
9. Were your senses more vivid than usual? 
0 = No 
1 = More vivid than usual 
2 = Incredibly more vivid 
 
 
10. Did you seem to be aware of things going 
on elsewhere, as if by extrasensory 
perception (ESP)? 
0 = No 
1 = Yes, but the facts have not been checked 
out 
2 = Yes, and the facts have been checked out 
 
 
11. Did scenes from the future come to you? 
0 = No 
1 = Scenes from my personal future 
2 = Scenes from the world's future 
 
 
12. Did you feel separated from your body? 
0 = No 
1 = I lost awareness of my body 
2 = I clearly left my body and existed outside it 
 
 
13. Did you seem to enter some other, 
unearthly world? 
0 = No 
1 = Some unfamiliar and strange place 
2 = A clearly mystical or unearthly realm 
 
 
14. Did you seem to encounter a mystical 
being or presence, or hear an unidentifiable 
voice? 
0 = No 
1 = I heard a voice I could not identify 
2 = I encountered a definite being, or a voice 
clearly of mystical or unearthly origin 
 
 
15. Did you see deceased or religious spirits? 
0 = No 
1 = I sensed their presence 
2 = I actually saw them 
 
 
16. Did you come to a border or point of no 
return? 
0 = No 
1 = I came to a definite conscious decision to 
'return' to life 
2 = I came to a barrier that I was not permitted 
to cross; or was 'sent back' against my will. 
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One controversy surrounding reports of NDEs related to cardiac arrests is the indication 
from electroencephalography tests that brain activity will cease within 20-30 seconds of cardiac 
arrest (Parnia 2014; Parnia et al. 2014). This indicates the possibility of mental experiences with 
no corresponding brain activity. No doubt, critiques such as Mobbs and Watt (2011) propose that 
neurobiology can explain all NDEs related to cardiac arrest while all memories of NDEs formed 
before or after the temporary cessation of brain activity. I continue to analyse Mobbs and Watt 
(2011) in the next section. 
 
5. Mobbs and Watt on NDEs 
Mobbs and Watt (2011) note that 3% of the public had NDEs, and the authors propose that 
neurobiology can explain all NDEs while they explain five features of NDEs, that is, (1) an 
awareness of being dead, (2) out-of-body experiences, (3) a tunnel of light, (4) meeting deceased 
people, and (5) positive emotions. The authors also refer to a case study of a female patient 
during a hypoglycemic episode with no cardiac arrest. The patient was in a dream-like state with 
rapid eye movement (REM) and recounted memories from her episode that are classic features of 
NDEs. This indicates a case of an NDE during a REM dream state. The authors inform us of 
important discoveries in neuroscience that need consideration when analysing NDEs, but the 
explanations are not exhaustive. 
Here is a summary of Mobbs and Watt's neurobiological explanations for five features of 
NDEs: 
1. An awareness of being dead is imagined by patients with Cotard's syndrome, which is 
a rare condition that sometimes causes delusions of being consciously dead. 
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2. Out-of-body experiences are often described as feelings that one is floating outside of 
one's body and sometimes autoscopy, which is seeing one's body from above. Case 
studies indicate that out-of-body experiences can occur during (1) interrupted sleep 
patterns, (2) vivid hallucinations while awake, or (3) artificial inducement.   
3. Envisioning a tunnel of light can be artificially induced. 
4. Meeting deceased people is similar to Alzheimer's and Parkinson's patients suffering 
from vivid audio and visual hallucination of ghosts or monsters. 
5. Positive emotions can be induced by medicinal and recreational drug use. 
Greyson, Holden, and van Lommel (2012) responded. They affirmed that NDEs are 
completely natural phenomena and that research of how neurophysiology correlates to NDEs is 
important. They also criticised Mobbs and Watt (2011) for (1) ignoring aspects of NDEs that 
they could not explain and (2) overlooking a substantial body of empirical research on NDEs. 
For example, neurophysiological models do not explain lucid experiences that occur during 
cardiac arrest when consciousness should be fragmentary or absent. Also, their response cited 
Holden (2009) who says that there are 107 qualitative cases of resuscitated patients who reported 
the perception of events they should not have been able to perceive, while investigation indicated 
that 91% of the events were completely accurate. 
Finally, Mobbs (2012) responded to Greyson, Holden, and van Lommel (2012) by saying 
that there is nothing substantial in the academic literature about NDEs because there are only 
anecdotes and questionnaires. Mobbs also criticised the use of the term paranormal in NDE 
research in medical journals to imply that some mental phenomena is outside a reductionist 
framework of natural science because paranormal commonly means beyond scientific 
investigation. 
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Mobbs's (2012) criticism of research questionnaires is noteworthy because it signifies the 
colloquial hierarchy of hard sciences and soft sciences. For example, hard science is associated 
with the natural sciences, quantitative research, and controlled experiments; while soft science is 
associated with the social sciences, qualitative research, and open-ended questionnaires. 
Setting aside unfair generalizations of hard and soft science, all sets of quantitative data 
do not have the same quality. Consider the following examples of data in the field of medical 
neuroscience: results from heart monitoring, brain monitoring, MRIs, x-rays, tissue cultures, 
blood tests, and closed-ended questionnaires about individual perspectives. Data sets from 
medical questionnaires are vital for medical science while they contain a subjective element of 
individual perspectives unlike most other data sets from medical research (Jones, Baxter, and 
Khanduja 2013). I suppose that the subjective element of questionnaires is a factor that prompted 
Mobbs (2012) to criticise that NDE research uses nothing more than anecdotes and medical 
questionnaires. 
Regardless of the limits of medical questionnaires, as previously cited, Holden (2009) 
noted that there are 107 qualitative cases of resuscitated patients who reported the perception of 
events they should not have been able to perceive, while investigation indicated that 91% of the 
events were completely accurate. Also, as previously noted, neurophysiological models do not 
explain lucid experiences that occur during cardiac arrest when consciousness should be 
fragmentary or absent. Furthermore, no conceivable technology could detect if mental activity 
apart from brain activity is existent or nonexistent, so mixed methods of structured 
questionnaires and qualitative research is the best possible approach to research the question.    
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6. AWARE Results 
AWARE was a four-year multicenter clinical study that focused on the cognitive deficits of 
patients who survive cardiac arrest (Parnia et al. 2014). The cognitive deficits include post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The study used structured interviews to explore if mental 
experiences during CPR had contributed to the cognitive deficits. For example, anecdotal reports 
in qualitative studies indicate that a broad range of mental experiences including awareness is 
associated with CPR, while AWARE is the first systematic study of the mental experiences. 
Consider the following results: 
1. No patient exhibited signs of clinical consciousness during cardiac arrest, while 
previous research indicates that brain activity completely ceases with 20-30 seconds 
of cardiac arrest. 
2. The study recorded 2,060 cardiac arrests; 330 of the patients met the eligibility for 
participation; 140 of the patients completed stage 1 interviews; 101 of the stage 1 
interviewees completed stage 2 interviews. 
3. Stage 1 interviews reported that 55 of the 140 patients recalled detailed memories 
during cardiac arrest. 
4. Stage 2 interviews reported memories of the following: events in the hospital room, 
peace, unity with the universe, bright light, senses more vivid than usual, extrasensory 
perception, feeling separated from their body, entering an unearthly world, 
encountering a mystical being or presence, family, animals, plants, fear, and violence 
or persecution. 
5. Stage 2 interviews reported that 9 patients had an NDE; 2 of the patients with an NDE 
had an out of body experience with visual awareness of events in the hospital room. 
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6. One of the 2 patients who reported visual awareness was healthy enough for a stage 3 
interview; medical records and the third interview verified that the patient accurately 
recalled events that he reported to see during his cardiac arrest in the hospital room. 
7. The verified visual awareness during an out of body experience does not suggest that 
the out of body experience was hallucinatory or illusionary. 
8. Previous studies suggest mental experience that corresponds to no brain activity. 
9. Neuroscience has no known etiology for mental experience that corresponds to no 
brain activity. 
 
Although no patient demonstrated clinical signs of consciousness during CPR as assessed 
by the absence of eye opening response, motor response, verbal response whether 
spontaneously or in response to pain (chest compressions) with a resultant Glasgow 
Coma Scale Score of 3/15, nonetheless 39% (55/140) (category 2) responded positively 
to the question "Do you remember anything from the time during your unconsciousness?" 
(Parnia et al. 2014, 1802) 
 
Cardiac arrest patients typically indicate no conscious responsiveness unless resuscitated. 
Also, electroencephalography tests indicate that brain activity ceases within 20-30 seconds of 
cardiac arrest. The window of 20-30 seconds evidently involves diminishing brain activity 
without possible responsiveness. The study examined the patients for evidence of mental activity 
and specifically awareness during the period of time with no brain activity. 
One element of the test yielded no results. The four-year study took place in 15 hospitals 
while 50 to 100 shelves were installed in areas where cardiac arrest resuscitation would likely 
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occur, for example, acute medical wards. Each shelf contained one easily identifiable image that 
was visible only from above, such as looking down from the ceiling. The plan was to evaluate 
possible visual awareness during cardiac arrest with the image acting as a visual marker. 
However, only two of the patients reported visual awareness during cardiac arrest and those two 
cases of cardiac arrest occurred in non-acute areas without the shelves.  
Regardless of the study generating no data for visual awareness during cardiac arrest in 
rooms with shelves, the other data is important. For example, 55 of the 140 interviewed patients 
reported memories during the time of clinical unconsciousness; 9 patients who reported 
memories scored 7 or more points on the NDE scale, which indicates an NDE; and 2 NDE 
patients reported visual awareness while feeling separated from their body. Only 1 of the 2 
patients who reported visual awareness during cardiac arrest felt healthy enough for a stage 3 
interview. The single stage 3 interview and medical records indicate that the patient accurately 
reported events in the hospital room during his cardiac arrest. Likewise, the stage 3 interview and 
medical records suggest that the visual awareness was not a hallucination or illusion. 
The authors concluded that cardiac arrest survivors experience a broad range of 
experiences that include peace, fear, and awareness. While reports of explicit awareness are rare, 
it is unclear if these experiences contribute to PTSD. Also, additional studies are needed to 
determine the role of explicit and implicit memory during cardiac arrest and the impact of this 
phenomenon on the occurrence of PTSD and other life adjustments among cardiac arrest 
survivors.  
 
7. Discussion of Two Propositions 
I conclude by discussing Propositions 2 and 3 which are mutually exclusive to each other: 
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(2) All reports of memories from experiences during temporary death involve an illusory 
recollection of chronology while the origin of all the memories occurred before or 
after the temporary cessation of brain activity. 
 
(3) Some mental activity occurs with no corresponding brain activity, especially 
postmortem.  
  
Propositions 2 and 3 are mutually exclusive to each other while each proposition has one 
truth value, that is, completely true or not completely true. Mobbs and Watt (2011) and Mobbs 
(2012) imply that Proposition 2 is completely true. Alternatively, Parnia et al. (2014) imply that 
Proposition 3 is completely true. 
A proponent of reductive naturalism necessarily agrees with Proposition 2. Despite 
Greyson, Holden, and van Lommel (2012) implying that a postmortem mental mechanism is 
completely natural, such a proposal would never be considered by a reductive naturalist because 
no conceivable technology could detect a postmortem mental mechanism.    
Alternatively, liberal naturalists consider the possibility of inferring the existence of an 
unobservable entity. Few might have reasonable doubt in Proposition 2 because of the following 
Propositions 4–5: 
 
(4) Neuroscience indicates that the consciousness of cardiac arrest patients should be 
fragmented or absent, but a significant minority of cardiac arrest patients report lucid 
memories from their period of temporary death. 
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(5) A survey indicates that multimillions of people believe that they have memories that 
originated during temporary death. 
 
The majority of liberal naturalists might reject that Propositions 4–5 indicate reasonable 
doubt in Proposition 2 because of the frailty of human memory, the brain's ability to hallucinate, 
and evidence that some NDEs occur during REM. Nonetheless, I want to explore the 
implications of doubting Proposition 2. First, a post-mortem mental mechanism would be an 
unobservable mental mechanism. Second, a few philosophers of mind propose the existence of a 
postmortem mental substance in the context of emergent dualism, for example, Hasker (2001; 
2018) and Zimmerman (2010). Likewise, the AWARE proposal of mental experience with no 
corresponding brain activity can be discussed in the context of emergent dualism. 
Emergent dualism is a type of substance dualism. Substance dualism says that living 
humans possess a biological body which is a physical substance and a mind or soul which is a 
nonphysical substance; while the physical and nonphysical work together. The most prominent 
type of substance dualism is Cartesian dualism which says that each human soul is a special 
creation, but the special creation of each human soul incoheres with liberal naturalism. However, 
emergent dualism says that the human brain naturally generates the human mind, while the brain 
and mind work together in consciousness and other cognitive processes till death do they part. 
I appreciate the concept of emergent dualism, but I prefer to shift the language. First, I 
disagree with dividing the universe into physical substance and nonphysical substance. For 
example, I shy to say that an organically generated mental substance is nonphysical. Consider 
my section 2 description of gravitational interaction. The cause of gravity is an unobservable 
entity but nonetheless a fundamental interaction of physics with powerful and ubiquitous effects. 
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Similarly, I prefer to say that the human mental substance is a physical but unobservable 
substance. Second, I prefer to say that the biologically living human mind is an observable-
unobservable dualism. The brain is the observable mental mechanism while what emergent 
dualists call the nonphysical substance, soul, or spirit is the unobservable mental mechanism. 
I also compare the possibility of an observable-unobservable dualism of mind to the 
dualisms of jurisprudence and economics. For example, political entities such as a city or a 
sovereign state are a type of legal person, while every settled political entity has a defined 
territory, a human population, and a government. The territory and human population are 
observable entities while the government is an unobservable entity. Regardless that any 
government is unobservable, all major schools of jurisprudence define that a codified political 
entity is a concrete entity. Also, jurisprudence and economics define two top types of property, 
that is, tangible property and intangible property. Tangible property is anything that can be 
touched while intangible property include financial assets and intellectual property. The 
documentation of a piece of intangible property might be tangible, but the property is 
nonetheless intangible. Regardless that any piece of intangible property is unobservable, the 
fields of jurisprudence and economics define that a piece of intangible property is a concrete 
entity. Furthermore, Goetz (2016, 132) defines that any government or any piece of intangible 
property are a physical entity because they foremost derive their existence from the fundamental 
interactions of physics. Additionally, the effects of governments and pieces of intangible 
property are evident: 
 
Despite the intangible nature of government, research of past and current phenomena 
indicates strong evidence that legal persons sometimes generate enormous force. Great 
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nations rise and fall. Government officials declare war and armies fight with tangible 
weapons. Legal persons buy and sell property. Universities grant academic degrees. A 
cartoon character is intangible property that generates multibillions of US dollars per 
year. Banks and law enforcement foreclose mortgages of family residences. Governments 
and economies around the world operate according to the logic of law. (Goetz 2014, 36; 
2016, 132–33) 
 
Moreover, social scientists measure the distributions and influences of governmental 
power. 
Jurisprudence and economics are evident examples in the social sciences of observable-
unobservable dualism while the unobservable entities such as governments and pieces of 
intangible property are organically generated. These cases of dualism cohere with liberal 
naturalism and compare to my proposal for the possibility of the observable-unobservable mind. 
One major difference between an unobservable mental mechanism and a government or piece of 
intangible property is that the survival of governments and economics is dependent on the 
survival of biological humans while the survival of unobservable mental mechanisms is not 
dependent on the survival of biological humans. Another major difference between an 
unobservable mental mechanism and a government or piece of intangible property is that the 
existence of governments and pieces of intangible property is far more evident than the existence 
of unobservable mental mechanisms. Section 3 describes the no miracles argument for scientific 
realism and applies it to the majority of basic scientific theory taught in contemporary natural 
science textbooks in all of the inhabited continents. The no miracles argument can also apply to 
the reality of governments and pieces of intangible property because of the obvious evidence and 
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worldwide consensus. However, the no miracles argument does not apply to controversial 
proposals such as mental experience with no corresponding brain activity and emergent dualism. 
Nonetheless, mere reasonable doubt in Proposition 2 indicates the possibility of naturally 
generated unobservable mental mechanisms. 
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